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Keynote Address
COMPENSATING LARGE NUMBERS OF
PEOPLE FOR INFLICTED HARMS
JACK B. WEINSTEIN*
This conference was appropriately set at Geneva, just a few miles
from the great collider at CERN where cosmologists and physicists
are testing the theory that ours is only one of many side-by-side uni-
verses with far more than three dimensions, operating particularly on
gravitons in the company of quarks.1  Perhaps in civil procedure too,
we live in separate universes—but, we can visit with each other and
perhaps find commonalities.
The message is, “Open up your minds, almost anything is possi-
ble.”  I will emphasize the universe I know best, that of the United
States.
Acts by individuals and entities sometimes have adverse impacts
on many people.  Globalization and changes in technology increase
hazards and a growing nucleus of potential litigants.
Shall the resulting damages be compensated by those who create
the harm?  How?  Should large groups of injured be treated differ-
ently from those persons hurt in individual occurrences?
What substantive laws should apply?  Can one substantive law
control cases arising in many states and nations?  On what theory can
a useful conflict of laws rule be developed for group litigations?
What courts or administrative bodies should have competence?
Plaintiffs usually have a wide choice of venue.  Preemption and other
considerations may reduce those options.  Should they?  How?
Which prospective defendants should be subject to jurisdiction?
The laws of personal jurisdiction vary widely.  Many countries would
Copyright  2001 by Jack B. Weinstein.
* United States Senior District Judge.  This paper is a slight modification of the keynote
address at the Conference on Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective sponsored by the
Duke University School of Law and the University of Geneva Faculty of Law, Geneva, Swit-
zerland, July 21-22, 2000.
1. See Nima Arkani-Hamed et al., The Universe’s Unseen Dimensions, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN, Aug. 2000, at 62.
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reject, for example, United States “tag jurisdiction.”  Should treaties
(now developing) or rules permit one tribunal to bind all possible par-
ties2—plaintiff and defendant, those whose injuries are already mani-
fest and those who will learn of them in the future?  What should
those personal jurisdiction rules be?
Are there procedures capable of handling such large aggrega-
tions of claims and parties fairly and speedily?  What are they?
Each of our countries gives different answers to these questions.
Even within the United States more than fifty sovereignties, federal
and state, result in almost unimaginable complexities in mass adjudi-
cations.
We have created practices through class actions, consolidations,
transfers of cases, cooperation among courts, mass merchandising of
lawyers’ services so one law firm may control and dispose of more
than ten thousand cases at a time, and settlement techniques that may
prove of some interest at this conference. Whether any part of our
exotic practice can or should take root elsewhere is not apparent.
Put aside for the moment the procedural problems in juridically
finalizing a settlement or trial in U.S. courts of a school desegregation
case, the “slave laborers” cases,3 the human rights cases of the Philip-
pines,4 or the holocaust victims’ assets cases.5  Turn to a, by compari-
son, banal example of future litigations.
Assume a popular unregulated herbal supplement is being manu-
factured by companies in many states and countries.  Some produce
and sell only locally.  Others operate nationally and internationally.
Distributors use worldwide internet, television, and other forms of
2. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Newman, Disputes with Foreign States, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 30, 2000,
at 3 (noting recent trend to reduce the scope of sovereign immunity, which has “manifested it-
self in the arbitration context, as private parties investing in foreign countries have been af-
forded, by way of investment and other treaties, the right to bring arbitration proceedings
against foreign countries for violations of obligations under those treaties”); see also Michael
Goldharber & Michael J.N. Bowles, The Court That Came in from the Cold, THE AMERICAN
LAWYER 101 (noting the increased presence of American lawyers in international arbitrations,
which is driven, ironically, “by the decline of the American hegemony”).
3. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Germans Sign Agreement to Pay Forced Laborers of
Nazi Era, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2000, at A3; Romanian Gypsies Wait for Slave-Labor Payment,
N.Y.TIMES, July 15, 2000, at A4.
4. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1996) (permitting jury to hear
compensatory damages claims brought by class of political opponents of Ferdinand Marcos who
allegedly suffered human rights abuses at his behest).
5. See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (ap-
proving settlement agreement which called for the payment of $1.25 billion by two leading Swiss
banks to a class of Holocaust victims).
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merchandising.  Some foreign companies (and their holding compa-
nies) sell in very small quantities in each of many states in the United
States.  Purchases can be made online directly from the manufacturer
and in almost any drug store.  Brand names are used, but “The Prod-
uct” is generic.  Telephone, internet, and credit card orders utilize
satellites, and electronic bank transfers settle accounts, mainly
through New York, London, Zurich, and Tokyo.  Suddenly, there are
indications that the product has serious adverse effects.
An action is brought on behalf of plaintiffs from all over the
world (with lots more to come) against distributors and manufactur-
ers in a New York Federal District Court.  Were this, as I assume, an
action not based on federal substantive law, there would be no diver-
sity jurisdiction for named plaintiffs from some of the states; they
could not join the action except as non-named parties in a class ac-
tion.
U.S. courts strongly attract such global disputes.6  This magnet-
ism is due to four factors.  First, our procedural and jurisdictional
rules are in general helpful to plaintiffs (and our judges are likely to
be independent).  Second, our courts tends to award high money
judgments.  Third, the substantive law tends to favor plaintiffs; re-
cently for example, Canada sued in an American court for tobacco
related damages because of treble damages available under our fed-
eral racketeering law and stronger fraud provisions;7 and, of course,
there is the possibility of almost limitless punitive damages.  Fourth,
there is a powerful plaintiffs’ bar capable of financing and prosecuting
these cases.
Nevertheless, our federal system creates special problems in effi-
ciently resolving a mass dispute in one court.  Congress and the courts
are reluctant to recognize that a new world economic and technologi-
6. See, e.g., David Rhode, Jury in New York Orders Bosian Serb to Pay Billions, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2000, at A10 (“A jury in federal court in Manhattan. . . ordered Radovan
Karadzic, the former Bosnian Serb wartime leader, to pay $4.5 billion in damages to victims of
rape, torture and genocide”); cf. Sean Farrell, U.K. Group Actions Don’t Pay Like U.S. Class
Actions, NAT’L L.J. July 10, 2000, at B20 (“The scope for multiparty actions in England is far
more limited than it is in the United States.  For a start, class actions are not allowed.”).  But cf.
Richard O. Faulk, Armageddon Through Aggregation?  The Use and Abuse of Class Actions in
International Dispute Resolution, 2 CLASS ACTION LITIGATION REPORT 362 (May 2001) (criti-
cizing this tendency to disregard limits other nations may have on litigation); Mark Ballard, For-
eign Firms Get New Appeal Right, Panel rules NAFTA shield covers Canadian, Mexican gripes
about U.S. verdicts, NAT’L L.J., May 19, 2001, at 1.
7. See Julian Beltrame & Gordon Fairclough, Canada Accuses R.J. Reynolds Tobacco of
Smuggling Plot, Sues for $1 Billion, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 1999, at B2.
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cal order requires some rethinking of our narrow jurisdiction and
choice of law shibboleths.
Disasters such as those sketched in the hypothetical, be they
chemicals in the Danube, an explosion of an atomic electric plant, ex-
tensive human rights deprivations, securities frauds, or individually
imbibed pharmaceutical poisons, know no national boundaries.8  How
should we handle them?
Along with issues of choice of substantive law, tribunal compe-
tence, personal jurisdiction, and appropriate venue, there are abstruse
difficulties in factual determinations, particularly those dealing with
science.  How can the plaintiffs prove general and specific causation
in the hypothetical?  What discovery procedures should be available?
National and international pools of scientists may well be needed.
Some in France have called for an international world scientific body
to resolve disputes such as whether hormones in U.S. beef are car-
cinogenic or DNA modifications in grain are harmful.  The German
system and our Daubert pretrial expert gatekeeping hearings or ap-
pointments of expert panels may prove useful in such litigation.
How, within the rule of law, can we promptly make whole the
many who have suffered as a result of acts of others?  We need to try
to deter such events in the future as well as compensate the injured
promptly.  We need to try to avoid destroying whole industries.  We
need to try to reduce transaction costs and burdens on our judicial
structures.
Underlying the inquiry is a fundamental issue: how should we
compensate the injured?  We can:
1. Ignore them and leave them to their extended families or pri-
vate charity on the theory that their suffering is simply the
cost of living in a modern society. This will not be acceptable
in a relatively wealthy western democracy;
2. Provide a full social welfare system.  Most countries are
moving away from this solution as too burdensome for the
nation; or
8. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE
EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES (1995);
Jack B. Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private Delicts: Evolving Roles of Administrative,
Criminal and Tort Law, Address Before the University of Illinois Law School (Oct. 17, 2000) in
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001); Jack B. Weinstein, The Restatement of Torts and the
Courts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001); Jack B. Weinstein, Mass Tort Jurisdiction and Choice of
Law in a Multinational World Communicating by Extraterrestrial Satellites, 37 WILLAMETTE  L.
REV. 145, 154-55 (2001); see also Michael Tigar, Justice isn’t local anymore, NAT’L L.J., June 12,
2000, at A21.
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3. Combine some mix of public welfare, private assistance as by
workers’ compensation, and court, administrative, and alter-
native dispute resolution (ADR) remedies.
I.  INDIVIDUAL COURT ACTIONS
The United States relies heavily on a court adjudicated tort
claims component for compensation.  In this model at its simplest
level, there is a single victim and a single defendant.9  A jury is called
upon to determine what occurred, whether the defendant was negli-
gent, and how much in compensation the plaintiff is entitled to.
These individual cases usually avoid difficult issues of choice of law,
complex statistical models to prove causation, and the possibility of
bankrupting damage awards.
When the dispute involves many claims, we allow the transfer of
actions from one federal court to another—sometimes for the pretrial
stages only—and their consolidation.  Forum non conveniens is sel-
dom relied upon.10  Direct transfer from one state’s court to that of
another state is not possible.  The federal courts and many states at-
tempt to coordinate and consolidate large actions.  Aggregation re-
duces the burdens of multiplicative litigation and allows a single judge
to develop a greater familiarity with the case.  In addition, it often fa-
cilitates a global settlement of all claims.11  Recent proposed legisla-
tion to permit removal of mass cases from state courts to the federal
courts for national consolidation has been opposed by the plaintiffs’
bar as a step in reducing plaintiffs’ rights.12
9. See Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Deacademificationof Tort Theory, 48
KAN. L. REV. 59, 67 (1999) (“[T]raditional tort theorists look[ed] at the law of torts. . . as an ef-
fort to develop a coherent set of principles to decide whether this plaintiff was entitled to com-
pensation from this defendant as a matter of fairness between the parties.”) (citations omitted).
10. But see, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 89 (2d Cir. 2000) (ap-
plying doctrine of forum non conveniens to suits under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 28
U.S.C. § 1350, involving alleged abuses of the international law of human rights); Friedrich K.
Juenger, Forum Non Conveniens—Who Needs It?, Address Before the Tulane Colloquium of
the International Association of Procedural Law (Oct. 1998) (“Lawyers who attempt to enhance
their clients’ chances of success by litigating in a friendly forum do not deserve censure.  Indeed,
because attorneys are duty-bound to further their clients’ interests, their failure to exploit the
benefits of jurisdictional overlap may amount to malpractice.”).
11. See Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation and Settlement of Mass Torts, 148 PA. L. REV.
1943, 1949 (2000) (“Aggregation has many advantages.  It offers the promise of a single, uni-
form, fair, and efficient resolution of all claims growing out of a set of events so related as to be
a mass tort.”) (citations and quotations omitted).
12. See Elizabeth S. Strong, Supreme Court Considers Class Action Jurisdiction, N.Y. L.J.,
Mar. 29, 2000, at 1 (“Class action plaintiffs have also turned to state courts specifically to avoid
the application of the more stringent federal class certification standards.”).
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The effect of non-class action consolidation is sometimes
achieved by one law firm taking on many thousands of clients through
its connections to unions or by advertising.  Many thousands of such
cases have been settled this way in my court.  They have involved de-
fective breast implants and injuries caused by pharmaceuticals and by
asbestos.  A special master is often appointed by the court to assist
the parties in resolving the claims.  A few cases are usually tried to fix
settlement values for the rest.  Fees are not controlled by the court
and, in total, they may be excessive in these non-class actions.
II.  ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
An alternative or supplement to the traditional tort model is the
administrative one.  Compensation may be provided directly through
such devices as Social Security Disability awards, workers compensa-
tion, or Securities and Exchange Commission orders.
Administrative agencies, for example the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration and the Food and Drug Administration,
prescribe rules that seek to protect individuals.  If a company com-
plies with these regulations, should it be protected from tort liability?
Beyond the prescriptive role, administrative agencies also play
an enforcement role.  They investigate potential violations and have
in many cases the power to prosecute such offenses civilly.
The federal Comptroller of the Currency, for example, recently
settled an enforcement proceeding against a large credit card com-
pany (Providian) so that it will reimburse its individual customers by
three hundred million dollars for false advertising.13  Civil class ac-
tions pending in state court in California were coordinated and the
District Attorney of San Francisco and the Attorney General of Cali-
fornia participated in the criminal aspects.  Other related actions
across the country are still pending.14
Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission has just agreed on a
settlement in a price-fixing case using most of the money to reimburse
consumers in the sum of almost $150 million.  At least one state At-
torney General participated.15  The Insurance Commissioner of Flor-
ida just negotiated a settlement of more than $200 million for all
13. See David Leonhardt, Credit Card Issuer Will Repay Millions to Some Customers, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 2000, at A1.
14. See id.
15. See Stephen LaBaton, Generic-Drug Maker Agrees to Settlement in Price-Fixing Case,
N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2000, at A1.
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states for overcharging African Americans.  Fines were paid to some
states.16
Large fines by the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion, the Consumer Products Safety Commission, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and the Food and Drug Administration serve
the same kind of role.  In the tobacco cases the Attorneys General of
all the states settled part of the litigation, leaving the federal Attorney
General’s action and private actions unresolved.
Modifications of available administrative practice to force dis-
gorgement to those injured as in this series of recent litigations seems
desirable.  This developing approach has not yet, however, been gen-
erally recognized.
I have urged more use of what I referred to in an opinion—
somewhat misleadingly—as the French model.17  It combines aspects
of the administrative, traditional tort, and criminal practice.  In this
model, administrative agencies (or courts) impose fines or restitution
on companies or individuals to punish them for violating the rules.
The proceeds of these orders are then used to compensate victims in
lieu of their having to rely on the tort system.
This integrated approach avoids problems such as exist in a case
presently before me based on a security fraud.  My court has the
criminal action, another court has a class action by shareholders, and
still a third has proceedings brought by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.  By contrast, in a recent criminal case I provided for res-
titution to be distributed by class counsel in the related civil class ac-
tion for fraud; both cases had been assigned to me as related.
One problem with integration is that many state and federal
agencies and courts may be involved creating coordination problems.
There are differences in burdens of proof and other complications
that present difficulties.  Some federal legislators would permit mass
actions to be removed to the federal courts to enhance coordination
and avoid some federalism problems.18
16. See Joseph B. Treaster, Insurer Agrees it Overcharged Black Clients: Restitution in Bias
Case is Set at $206 Million, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2000, at A1.
17. See United States v. Ferranti, 928 F. Supp. 206, 217 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (“The analogous
but more developed procedure used by the respected French criminal-civil system demonstrates
that restitution as an added feature of criminal law is not inconsistent with due process.”); see
also United States v. Hollman Cheung, 952 F. Supp. 148, 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Successful ex-
amples of consolidated criminal and civil proceedings can be observed in the Swedish and
French systems, among others.”).
18. See Class Action Fairness Act, S. 353, 106th Cong. (2000); Senate Judiciary OKs Class
Action Bill, Rejects Attempts to Carve Out Exemptions, U.S.L.W., July 4, 2000, at 2006.
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I should like to get the reaction of some members of this audi-
ence to the notion that integration of the criminal, the administrative,
and the tort models to compensate for large scale delicts is now in or-
der in the United States and elsewhere.  
III.  CLASS ACTIONS
An alternative that has received increasing attention in recent
years is the class action model.  This device is frequently used in state
and federal courts where there are alleged injuries to large numbers
of people or institutional reform is sought.
Class actions can seek injunctive relief as well as money dam-
ages.  This device, for example, was effectively used in civil rights
cases seeking injunctive remedies to require desegregation of schools
or reform of prisons.
The American class action offers the advantages and disadvan-
tages that come from centralization of litigation.  The problems of
administration are compounded by two local factors: the constitu-
tionally required jury system and the American federal structure.
The jury system requires that evidence in these often complex
cases, if they reach trial, be tailored to a lay-body.  In addition, a jury
often requires damages to be determined individually for each claim-
ant.  For example, pending before me is a class action brought on be-
half of hundreds of thousands who suffer from cancer of the lungs
claimed to have been induced by smoking.  A judge (or settlement)
might provide a matrix that fits the entire class.  A jury will generally
need to make an award smoker by smoker—except possibly for puni-
tive damages.
Federalism may permit settlement in one state court binding the
nation.  But the federal system may also mandate subclasses for each
of our states with a different tort law.
Advantages of class actions include the following:
1. They reduce duplication of discovery, motion practice, and
pretrial procedures.
2. They allow a single judge to familiarize himself or herself
with the legal and factual issues.
3. They provide consistency of result for all the injured and for
the defendants.
4. They enhance the possibility of a single action resolving the
entire problem, hence preventing the need for repetitive liti-
gation of similar issues.  Those who opt out of the class (as is
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often possible) will generally represent but a small percent-
age of possible claimants.
5. They permit plaintiffs’ attorneys to generate enough capital
to conduct the litigation on a playing field level for both
sides.
6. They enhance the possibility of a global settlement, which
can provide reasonable relief for prospective claimants while
limiting the costs for both parties and providing closure to
the dispute for defendants.
7. They provide the possibility of a single fair punitive damage
amount instead of repetitive and overlapping punishment.
The question is open on whether there can be a free-standing
punitive class without an individually compensated class.
Such a free-floating class would be helpful in cases such as
tobacco.
8. They give the court power to control legal fees which may
otherwise be much greater than warranted.
9. They allow a single appellate panel to review the case.
10. Perhaps most important, they permit recoveries for small
claims by those who may not even know they were injured
and almost certainly would not bother to sue even if they had
known.  By, in theory, requiring a defendant to pay the entire
social cost of its delicts they should avoid much of the reason
for high punitive damages.
Disadvantages include the following:
1. The judge may lack familiarity with the law if more than one
jurisdiction’s substantive law must be applied.
2. They increase the complexity of the litigation.
3. They place a significant burden on individual courts, since
they are time consuming, containing more factual and legal
issues than any individual case.
4. They remove local issues from their normal venue.  Forum
shopping problems are compounded.
5. They supersede the local jury’s role and replace it with a jury
that may be unfamiliar with local conditions.
6. They often require the application of many different substan-
tive laws, some of which are still in a state of uncertainty.
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7. They attenuate the usual individual client-attorney relation-
ship, creating new ethical pressures.
8. They are often in significant tension with federalism assump-
tions.  One elected state county judge may bind the nation.
9. They may force defendants to settle because of the threat of
huge awards.
10. Finally, there is the fundamental problem that the Supreme
Court has been dealing with—protecting the rights of those
class members with little knowledge of the suit, virtually no
ability to monitor their attorneys, and potential conflicts with
other members of the class.
These representational, ethical, and other problems can be dealt
with.  Judges can closely monitor the adequacy of representation and
the fairness of any proposed settlement in class actions while at the
same time assuring the court’s neutral indifference to the result.
There is a fundamental factor that weighs in favor of the class ac-
tion, assuming it is properly regulated—equalization among claimants
and between claimants and defendants.  I have presided over Agent
Orange, Asbestos, Breast Implants, Repetitive Stress Syndrome, and
DES cases, as well as civil rights, education, and prisoner cases.  Some
say class actions necessarily deprive people of due process.  I think
they are wrong.
The main advantage of such mass actions—as I have observed
them—is that one litigation protects the rights of many.  Persons who
would otherwise have claims that are too small to warrant the atten-
tion of entrepreneurial lawyers or who simply do not know that their
rights have been violated can be protected.
Paradoxically, such suits can sometimes frustrate equalization.
They tend to elevate the recovery of those with the most modest
claims above what might have been obtained in individual trials while
reducing recoveries for those with the most potent claims.  That
problem is somewhat obviated by the fact that those with the most
valuable claims can usually opt out and litigate on their own behalf.
There are often bitter battles between class attorneys and attorneys
who want to prosecute individual cases as well as struggles to domi-
nate in control of the litigation and for fees.
Class actions also offer a great advantage to defendants, enabling
them to bring to a close complex disputes so that they can get on with
their affairs and avoid the drain and transactional costs of continuing
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litigation.  Typically, even large settlements result in an increase in
stock market value of corporate defendants.
Prison and education authorities often welcome an authoritative,
face-saving decree.  Class actions are then a force for social advocacy.
Increasingly, as I have suggested, in our integrated global-
electronic-communication society, we find people from all over the
world using the almost unique procedures of the United States for
class actions to meet worldwide tort and other problems of the op-
pressed.  Already we have entertained actions against foreign tyrants
trampling on human rights from the Philippines to Paraguay, those
responsible for atrocities in Bosnia, as well as against multinational
corporations, banks and large institutions that cheated and abused in-
dividuals during and following the Nazi regime, and for an explosion
in Bhopal, India, that harmed tens of thousands of people.
Nevertheless, there is a growing antipathy, particularly in federal
appellate courts and in legislatures, to mass actions designed to pro-
tect the rights of many of those outside the mainstream of society.
Restrictions on tort actions of all kinds have been adopted.  What has
been characterized as the proper end for tort law—“efficient compen-
sation, economical administration, and effective accident preven-
tion”—is sometimes lost sight of in the lobbying game between law-
yers and industry lobbyists.
A recent amendment to the class action rules of the federal
courts provides for immediate review of the class certification deci-
sion.19  The greater control by appellate courts implied in this limita-
tion on our former strict non-interlocutory appeals procedure is ex-
pected to restrict further class actions, which tend to be more favored
by trial than by appellate judges.
Some justification for this opposition to class actions and other
forms of consolidation does exist.  They can be powerful clubs against
defendants who may be overwhelmed by the risks involved in oppos-
ing them.  They can be used to craft collusive settlements for the
benefit of plaintiffs’ attorneys and defendants.  But such risks and
other problems can be met by strict and strong judicial control.
As I noted at the outset, class actions present added difficulties
when they include an international element.  The problems of juris-
diction and choice of law when the dispute only involves American
19. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (1998) (“A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an
appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying class action certification under this
rule if application is made to it within ten days after entry of the order.  An appeal does not stay
proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the court of appeals so orders.”).
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parties is compounded when international parties are added. Within
the United States, we have a fairly uniform legal system, attitude, and
history from state to state, and each state is constitutionally required
to give full faith and credit to the decisions of another state.  This
common history and constitutionally mandated acceptance is absent
across international lines.
The American background explains much of the basis for the
success of the class action and of our amour for it.  Whole law school
courses, casebooks. and treatises are devoted to it.  Perhaps this fond
relationship stems from our love of mass production, as in the case of
the old black Ford Model T.
The favored result in many class actions continues to be a global
settlement.  This outcome, bringing to an end festering disputes, re-
duces transaction costs and provides a matrix for a fair distribution of
compensation.  In addition, non-monetary individual remedies can be
crafted which may permit opt-in to a court-administered medical
payment plan, as in one defective heart valve settlement, when inju-
ries develop in the future.
There is, I respectfully and with some diffidence suggest, a
democratic and participatory aspect of the U.S. congregate mass ac-
tions that may not exist in some of the compensation systems of the
other countries we will be discussing here.
We proceduralists seldom ask what may be the most pertinent
question: how do those injured feel about how their injuries are to be
compensated by the legal system?  Do they have a sense that there is
empathy for their suffering?  Do they have an active role in the pro-
ceeding, and what is it?  From a comparative viewpoint much of our
“customer’s” reactions and expectations will depend upon what soci-
ety has thus far afforded people like them.  Procedural law is notably
inertia bound—we think that what we have for the moment is time-
less—and that lack of openness to the new is stronger in layman and
legislators than in those of us actually involved in adjudication.
In the class action the plaintiff can vote with his or her feet by
opting out of the class.  He or she will have the right to be heard in
person, by lawyer, or by correspondence directed to the judge at the
“fairness hearing,” should the case be settled.  In bankruptcy there
will be a vote.  Lawyers have developed ways of dealing with large
numbers of claimants they “represent” through television cassettes,
“800” no charge telephone calls, setting up committees of claimants,
holding meetings with claimants, and utilizing court appointed special
masters.  In the diethylstilbestrol and other cases I supervised there
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was an opportunity to explain their situation to a judge or court ap-
pointed special master.  By contrast, a European system that depends
upon a government compensation scheme or suit by a non-
governmental organization (NGO) does not use such a democratic
system except in the broadest sense that the government is demo-
cratic; the NGO may be operating without an active membership de-
termining who it sues or what it settles for.
In this respect the U.S. system may be loosely described in some
respects as a “bottom-up” system rather than one utilizing a “top-
down” approach.  The former model sometimes leads to a more cha-
otic situation, but democracy tends sometimes, by its very nature of
limited control—contrary to a strong hierarchical system—to be
somewhat unruly and even, in the short run, relatively expensive.
It might be useful to consider some detailed case histories—the
Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska compared to the spills off the French
coast and how the various potential injured parties were dealt with.
Explosions in Mexico, the United States, Italy, and elsewhere, as well
as other environmental and chemical problems such as diethylstilbe-
strol or thalidomide, provide comparable examples.  There are no
dearth of them in modern society.
I take it that this audience does not suffer from what Professor
Mary Davis calls “fear of the ‘mass’” problems, stemming “from the
proceduralist’s [excessive] concern with the traditional right to indi-
vidualized, case-by-case adjudication” and the need to “in-
sure. . .integrity [of the judicial system] only through the traditional
adversary system.”  (emphasis added).20  Not fear, but open-minded
concern is appropriate as we discuss these matters today and tomor-
row.
20. Mary J. Davis, Toward the Proper Role for Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 OR. L. REV.
157, 159 (1998).
